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484 IRVINE V. RECLAMATION DrsT. No. 108 [24 C.2d 
based on and payable out of the assessment or assessme.Llts 
upon which the bonds so refunded were payable, in accordance 
with the provisions of section three thousand four hundred 
eighty of this. code." [9] One of the purposes of the stat-
ute authorizing the issuance of refunding bonds was to pro-
vide for the payment of post maturity interest on the old bonds 
by a regular and systematic scheme which may well be advan-
tageous to the governmental agency. Implicit in that pur-
pose is the thought that interest continues after maturity 
where no refunding bonds are issued. Moreover, inasmuch 
as the interest on the refunding bonds is in effect post ma-
turity interest on the old bonds, and the same assessments 
stand as security, the reasonable implication is that such as-
sessment in the first instance was intended to and did contem-
plate post maturity interest. 
Defendant complains that there is no source from which 
funds can be derived for the payment of post maturity in-
terest, thus evincing a legislative intent that it is not payable. 
We have heretofore seen that the assessments do contemplate 
such interest and there are indications in the statute that such 
is the case. Also it will be remembered that the statute pro-
vides for supplemental assessments when "any part of the 
principal or interest of said bonds ... shall remain unpaid 
after enforcement of the assessments." [10] Even if we 
assume that the supplemental assessment may not be made 
until all the bonds mature, and all steps for the enforcement of 
the assessment have been taken, and only when the supplemen-
tal assessment will not exceed the value of the benefits to the 
landowners from the project (see Rohwer v. Gibson, supra), 
that does not preclude the running of interest after maturity. 
Although the interest may run for a long time before the 
supplemental assessment is made, it cannot be said that eco-
nomic chaos for the district will follow. It has its relief by 
way of refunding bond issues which have proven effective 
to relieve such districts of financial pressure. 
There are affirmative indications that the original assess-
ment is the source for the payment of post maturity interest 
as well as the principal and ante maturity interest. Although 
not conclusive and possibly subject to other interpretations, 
taken with the act as a whole, they certainly tend to show 
that there is no prohibition in the statute against the payment 
of such interest. We are not in a position to work out the 
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minute details of the amounts that may be realized from those 
sources or precisely to what extent they extend to such in-
terest, but we are concerned rather with the legislative intent. 
The statute provides that the lien of any unpaid assessment 
shall continue until the bonds shall have been paid in full. 
The unpaid assessments bear interest at the rate of 7 per cent 
per annum from the date the bonds are issued until the bonds 
are "fully paid and discharged." The maximum rate of in-
terest on the bonds is 6 per cent. When the treasurer makes 
a call he shall add 15 per cent of the amount estimated to be 
required to cover possible delinquencies. A penalty of 10 
per cent is added for delinquency in payment of assessments, 
and both a redemptioner and a purchaser after the redemption 
period must pay interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum. 
Various other penalties are imposed and all of the fundS 
thereby realized are payable into the bond fund. 
On the whole we think that the legislative intent is clear 
that post maturity interest is recoverable on the bonds in-
volved in the instant actions, but is not recoverable on the 
interest coupons attached thereto. 
For the foregoing reasons the judgments are and each of 
them is, reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, 
J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition fora rehearing was denied August 7, 
1944. 
[So F. No. 16885. In Bank. July 10, 1944.] 
HELEN F. BENNETT, Appellant, v. GEORGINA E. FOR-
REST, as Executrix etc., et al., Respondents. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Jurisdiction Over Matters of Administra-
tion-Scope and Extent.-Ancillary to and as an incident of 
the probate court's jurisdiction in distribution proceedings, it 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 27; [2] Willii, 
§ 156; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 33; [4, 6] Decedents' Estates, 
§ 1053; [5] Appeal and Error, § 1179; [7] Trusts, § 131; [8] 
Trusts, § 303(1). 
J 
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has the power to determine the effect of a property settlement 
agreement on a husband's will and the persons to whom the 
pr(jperty of the estate is to be distributed. 
[2] Wills-Agreements as to Wills-Effect of Contract on Probate. 
-An agreement to make a will can have no effect on the will 
or the right to legacies thereunder inasmuch as it involves the 
making of a will after its execution. Where, however, an 
agreement follows a will previously executed, the issue is not 
whether there has been a breach of the agreement, but what 
effect, if any, the agreement would have in respect to a revoca-
tion of the will or a legacy under Prob. Code, § 73, or a relin-
quishment of any legacy or devise made in the will. 
[3] Decedents' Estates-Jurisdiction Over Matters of Administra-
tion-Title of Estate.-A sister of the deceased who claims 
that she is entitled to the whole estate as the sole heir at law, 
and that the widow forfeited her right to inherit by virtue of 
a property settlement agreement relinquishing her right as an 
heir, is not asserting a title or interest adverse to the estate, 
as such agreement does not affect the circumstance that her 
claim must be derived from her status as an heir, but is perti-
nent only as a factor in determining whether she is an heir 
who is entitled to inherit, which involves such questions as the 
degree of kinship, the presence or absence of prior heirs, or 
the existence of property which may pass by intestate suc-
cession. 
[4] Id.-Decree of Distribution-Conclusiveness.-In an action by 
decedent's sister to impress a trust on properties held by a 
widow as legatee, involving the issue of the effect of a prop-
erty settlement agreement on the widow's right to take under 
the will, a finding in the distribution decree in probate pro-
ceedings that the spouses had effected. a reconciliation and 
that their agreement was not in effect at the time of decedent's 
death, was res judicata of that issue and operated as a bar to 
the cause of action. The probate court having jurisdiction 
to determine said issue, its conclusion, right or wrong, was 
binding. 
[5] Appeal-Presumptions-Findings Outside Issues.-In an ac-
tion to establish a trust, upon appeal from a judgment for 
defendants on the judgment roll alone, where findings had 
been made that the issue involved was determined in probate 
proceedings, it will be assumed that any objection to defects 
or insufficiency in pleading the defense of res judicata was 
waived impliedly or by stipulation. 
[2] See 26 Cal.Jur. 834. 
[3] See IlA Cal.Jur. 94-96. 
July 19441 BENNETT V. FORRES'l 
[24 C.2d 485) 
487 
[6] Decedents' Estates-Decree of Distribution-Conclusiveness.-
In an action to establish a trust, the trial court's finding that 
it did not find that a finding in the distribution decree in pro-
bate proceedings was res judicata did not eliminate the pro-
bate decree as being res judicata where all the factors neces-
sary to make the decree of distribution available as a bar 
were found, as the ultimate conclusion of whether said decree 
was res judicata was one of law rather than of fact. 
[7] Trusts-Constructive Trusts-Wrongful Acquisition of Prop-
erty.-A constructive trust where one unlawfully comes into 
possession of property of a decedent is one imposed by law. 
[8] Id.-Actions to Establish-Pleading Constructive Trust-
Fraud.-In an action by decedent's sister to impress a trust 
on properties held by the widow as legatee, wherein it was 
alleged that the widow's claim under the will was in violation 
of a property settlement agreement and "constitutes a fraud 
upon plaintiff," the fraud at most was constructive, no specific 
acts of fraud having been alleged. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Frank T. Deasy, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Action to establish a trust and for injunctive relief. Judg-
ment for defendants affirmed. 
Fletcher A. Cutler, Duncan A. McLeod and Clarence M. 
Oddie for Appellant. 
Marcel E. Ced, Robinson & Leland for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.,-Plaintiff commenced this action against de-
fendant Georgina E. Forrest individually and as executrix 
of the last will of Francis G. Forrest, her deceased husband, 
to impress a trust on properties received from his estate by 
defendant, as legatee. 
In 1937, defendant commenced an action against her hus-
band for separate maintenance. Finally, after various pro-
ceedings were taken in that action, and on February 28, 1938, 
the parties entered into a property settlement agreement ad-
justing all of their property rights. The complaint in the 
separate maintenance action was amended to state a caUSe of 
action for divorce. Defendant was granted an interlocutory 
decree of divorce in March, 1938. No fiual decree was ever 
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entered. Defendant's husband died about 14 months after 
the interlocutory decree was granted. 
The will of Mr. Forrest dated .August 6, 1921, together with 
a. codicil dated August 14, 1933, was admitted to probate, and 
defendant, being named therein as such, was appointed execu-
trix. The will left all of decedent's property, with the excep-
tion of one legacy, to defendant. Plaintiff is a sister, and 
an heir at law of deceased, and she seeks by this action to have 
it determined that by the property settlement agreement de-
fendant forfeited all right to inherit from the deceased, or 
take under his will, and that the will was revoked as to de-
fendant, leaving plaintiff as sole heir of deceased. 
The property settlement agreement, after disposing of the 
property provides: "Each party shall have the right to dis-
pose of his or her property, by last will and testament, or 
otherwise, and each party agrees that all the estate of the 
other party shall, subject to the within agreement and to his 
or her debts and engagements, go and belong to the person, 
or persons, who would have become entitled thereto if the 
parties had never been married; and it is further convenanted 
and agreed that each party will permit any will of the other 
to be probated, and will allow administration upon his or 
her estate to be taken out by the persons or person who would 
have been entitled thereto, if the parties had never been mar-
ried .... 
"This agreement is intended to be, and is, a full, complete, 
entire and final settlement of all property rights between the 
parties and all rights, duties and obligations arising out of 
the marital relation now existing, and such rights, duties and 
obligations as might hereafter accrue but for this agreement; 
and each of the parties hereto does mutually agree to and 
does by these presents forever release and discharge the other 
party from all obligations, either in law, or in equity, arising 
out of the marital relation, or otherwise, for support, mainte-
nance, alimony, court costs or counsel fees, and shall thence-
forth entertain no claim upon the other, either conjugal, or 
otherwise, except as set forth in this agreement. Each party 
hereto further agrees to, and by these presents does waive, 
relinquish, quitclaim and release all right, title, claim or de-
mand of every nature in and to any property, either real, 
personal (1J' mixed, to be held or owned at any time in the 
/" 
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future by the other party hereto, whether acquired by pur-
chase, gift, bequest, descent, devise, or in any other manner, 
and wheresoever such property may be situate. And the par-
ties hereto, and each of them, do hereby expressly waive, relin-
quish and surrender any and all claims and rights to inherit 
or claim dower in, or family allowance or homestead from, or 
otherwise secure an interest in, any property whatsoever by, 
through or from the other party hereto, which claim and right 
said parties, and each of them, respectively do hereby relin-
quish and surrender in favor of all of the heirs, legatees, 
devisees and assigns of such party so dying, and to the ex-
clusion of either and each of said first and second parties 
hereto, respectively, including the right to administer upon 
the estate of the other party." 
It is alleged in the complaint that decedent's will was ad-
mitted to probate and defendant duly qualified as executrix 
thereof. Defendant, in her answer, denies the legal effect 
given to the property settlement agreement in the complaint 
and alleges in paragraph II of her first answer, "that hereto-
fore in the probate proceedings (in decedent's estate) ... 
in proceedings wherein plaintiff herein and defendants herein 
were parties and were on opposite sides, an order was duly 
made and entered in said proceedings wherein it was adjudi-
cated that plaintiff was not the sole heir at law of said Francis 
G. Forrest, deceased; that plaintiff herein appealed from said 
order, and said order was affirmed on appeal, and remittitur 
filed in said proceedings." And in paragraph III of her first 
answer, that defendant "claims to be entitled to distribution 
of a portion of the property of said estate pursuant to the 
terms of said will referred to in said complaint; that Georgina 
E. Forrest, as such executrix, has filed in said probate pro-
ceedings a petition for distribution of said estate to Georgina 
E. Forrest, individually, and to Jane B. Forrest, pursuant to 
the terms of said will; that plaintiff herein has filed objec-
tions to said petition and has petitioned for distribution of 
said estate to herself; that said petition and the objections 
thereto have been heard and submitted to the court for deci-
sion, and decision thereon is now pending; that said objec-
tions seek distribution of said estate to plaintiff upon the 
same grounds asserted in the complaint herein. " In her sec-
ond separate answer she alleges "that the issues, if any, pre-
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sen ted by the complaint have been determined in said probate 
proceedings. " The court found that all of the foregoing 
allegations in defendant's answer are true, except in reference 
to the allegation in paragraph III of the first answer in which 
it found "that in said probate proceedings a decree of dis-
tribution was heretofore made and entered directing distribu-
tion of said estate as prayed in the petition for distribution 
therein, that no appeal was taken therefrom, and that said 
decree has become final." Upon plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial the court amended its finding that the allegations as to 
the second answer were true by stating that the decree of 
distribution contained a finding "that prior to the death of 
said Francis G. Forrest, and after the execution of said agree-
ment, said decedent and Georgina E. Forrest effected and 
consnmmated a reconciliation and resumed marital relations; 
that said agreement dated February 28th, 1938, including the 
provisions thereof set forth in the opposition of Helen F. 
Bennett to petition for final discharge, was not in force or 
effect at the time of the death of said decedent; 
"That said decree of distribution was made and entered 
in said probate proceedings on December 18, 1941, and that 
no appeal has been taken from said decree of distribution, 
and that the time for appeal therefrom has expired. 
"This court does not find that this finding is res adjudi-
cata." 
The allegation in paragraph II of the first answer of de-
fendant, quoted above, referring to an order in the probate 
proceedings as having been affirmed on appeal, apparently 
refers to the order appointing defendant as executrix of the 
estate over the objection of plaintiff who there asserted that 
by the property settlement agreement defendant had waived 
her right to serve as executrix. (See Estate of Forrest, 43 
Cal.App.2d 347 [110 P.2d 1023].) There the court affirmed 
the order of appointment, but stated that no issue was in-
volved in regard to the right to take as a legatee under the 
. will. (Estate of Forrest, S1tpra, 350.) 
The findings of the trial court above-mentioned present the 
question of whether the decree of distribution was res judicata 
in the probate proceedings on the cause of action stated by 
plaintiff. The issues presented were whether or not dece-
dent's will was revoked as to defendant by the property settle-
./ 
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ment agreement, who was entitled to take under the will, and 
the matters incidental thereto such as the validity and effect 
of the agreement. 
[1] Ancilliary to and as an incident of the probate court's 
jurisdiction it had power to determine, as it did, the effect 
of the agreement on the will and to whom the property of 
the estate was to be distributed. It has been held generally 
that "Under various circumstances the probate court may 
determine the validity and effect of contracts when ancilliary 
to a proper judgment by it." (Dobbins v. Title Guarantee 
&; Trust 00., 22 Cal.2d 64, 68 [136 P.2d 572].) It has been 
held particularly, that in a proceeding to remove a wife as 
administratrix of the husband's estate, on the ground that she 
has ceased to be an heir by virtue of Ii marriage settlement 
agreement, the probate court has jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the validity and effect of the agreement (Estate of Oover, 
188 Cal. 133 [204 P. 583] ; See Estate of Warner, 6 Cal.App. 
361 [92 P. 191] ; Estate of Dobbins, 36 Cal.App.2d 536 [97 
P.2d 1051] ; Estate of ~McNutt, 36 Cal.App.2d 542 [98 P.2d 
253]) ; that in passing upon a petition by a widow for family 
allowance from her deceased husband's estate the validity 
and effect of a property settlement agreement may be deter-
mined (Estate of Yoell, 164 Cal. 540 [129 P. 999] ; Estate of 
Hamalian, 57 Cal.App. 169 [206 P. 1011]) ; that the validity 
and effect of a property settlement agreement could be con-
sidered in a will contest on the issue of sufficiency of the hus-
band's interest to contest the will (Estate of Edelman, 148 
Cal. 233 [82 P. 962, 113 Am.St.Rep. 231]) ; that an agreement 
did or did not constitute a renunciation of heirship in pro-
ceedings to determine heirship, and· the validity thereof 
(Estate of McOlelland, 181 Cal. 227 [183 P. 798]) ; and that 
a probate court in distribution proceedings may pass upon 
the question of whether or not one claiming to be an heir held 
such status by reason of an agreement between the deceased 
and another in which the former agreed to adopt the claimant . 
(Johnson v. Superior 00urt,102 Cal.App. 178 [283 P. 331].) 
It is of some significance, although the particular point was 
not disaussed, that in the followirig cases the issue of the effect 
of a property settlement agreement upon the right to take by 
will or succession was adjudicated by the probate court. 
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1101] j Estate of Boeson, 201 Cal. 36, 41 [255 P.800] j Estate 
of Walker, 169 Cal. 400 [146 P. 868] j Estate of Martin, 166 
Cal. 399 [137 P. 2] j Estate of Winslow, 121 Cal. 92 [53 P. 
362] j In re Davis, 106 Cal. 453 [39 P. 756] j Estate of Minier, 
215 Cal. 31 [8 P.2d 123, 81 A.L.R. 689] j Estate of Johnson, 
31 Cal.App.2d 251 [87 P.2d 900] j but see Weinstein v. Moers, 
207 Cal. 534 [279 P. 444].) In the distribution proceedings 
in the instant case the issue to be determined was: Who were 
entitled to take as beneficiaries of the estate Y As an incident 
to that determination the effect of the property settlement 
agreement could be determined; that is, whether it be viewed 
as constituting a renunciation by the defendant of the legacy 
under the will or a revocation of such legacy pursuant to sec-
tion 73 of the Probate Code. 
Plaintiff cites and relies upon caselS holding first, that a 
probate court may not determine the effect or validity of an 
ag"L'eement to make a will or devise property to a designated 
person in the probate proceeding following the death of one 
of the contracting parties (see 26 Cal.Jur. 834, § 163), and 
second, that a probate court has no jurisdiction to determine 
claims or titles adverse to the estate (Wi'kerson v. Seib, 20 
Cal.2d 556 [127 P.2d 904] j see llA Cal.Jur. 94-96). 
[2] The first proposition is based upon the ambulatory 
character of a will and that a will cannot be made irrevocable. 
Such an agreement can have no effect upon the will or the 
right to legacies thereunder inasmuch as it involve,' the making 
of a will after its execution. A different situation is pre-
sented when we have an agreement following a will previously 
executed. Then the issue is not whether there has been a 
breach of the agreement. It becomes a question of what 
effect, if any, the agreement would have in respect to a revo-
cation of the will or a legacy under section 73 of the Probate 
Code or a relinquishment of any legacy or devise made in 
the will. Certainly a determination of whether a will or a 
legacy or devise thereunder has been revoked or relinquished 
is for the probate court inasmuch as the direct problem pre-
sented is' the effectiveness of the will and who may take there-
under. The effect of a contract bearing upon that subject 
is an incidental matter that may be determined. To epito-
mize what we have said, the agreement in the instant case is 
manifestly not one to make a will, and the issue here pre-
sented is the effect of an agreement on a will already made. 
./ 
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[3] The second rule above-mentioned is not applicable 
because the claim of plaintiff is not the assertion of a title 
or interest adverse to the estate in the sense that phrase is 
used. She is an heir of the deceased by reason of her kin-
ship and she must rest her claim on that basis. True, the 
agreement provides as appears from the above-quoted excerpt 
therefrom that defendant relinquishes her right as an heir 
in favor of the heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent, 
but that relinquishment takes nothing away from the estate. 
If it does anything it restores the property to the estate, the 
only issue being who are the heirs and qualified to take from 
the estate either by will or intestate succession. The relin-
quishment amounts to nothing more than leaving the dece-
dent free to dispose of his property as he pleases whether that 
be by an act during life or by operation of law on death 
under the rules of intestate succession. Basically, plaintiff's 
claim must be derived from her status as an heir. The agree-
ment does not affect that circumstance. It comes into the 
picture only as a factor in determining whether she is an heir 
who is entitled to inherit, which involves such questions as 
the degree of kinship, the presence or absence of prior heirs, 
or the existence of property which may pass by intestate suc-
cession depending upon the presence or absence of a will un-
der which others may take. Hence, we cannot agree with 
plaintiff's assertion that she is claiming the title to the prop-
erty under the property settlement agreement and thus ad-
verse to the estate. 
[4] Plaintiff contends that the defense of res judicata was 
not pleaded and that the finding was against it. With respect 
to the pleading it is apparent from the heretofore quoted 
excerpts from defendant's answer that at the time it was filed 
the petition for the decree of distribution was pending in the 
probate court and defendant so asserted in her pleadings. 
She could do no more as the decree had not been rendered. 
Technically, the proper procedure would ha:ve been for her to 
file an amended or supplemental pleading after the decree of 
distribution was made. However, it is apparent from the 
findings that the issue was fully litigated. It is found that 
the identical issues raised in the trial in the instant case were 
determined in the probate proceedings, that is, the effect of 
the property settlement agreement on defendant's right to 
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take under the will. All the customary elements such as iden-
tity of subject matter, parties and the like were adjudicated. 
It is true that the findings mention a reconciliation as being 
a determinative factor nullifying the effect of the agreement, 
but we are not concerned with the validity or invalidity of 
the rules of law applied. The probate court having juris-
diction, its conclusion, right or wrong, is binding. [5] The 
appeal being taken upon the judgment roll alone, and find-
ings having been made which lead to only one conclusion, 
namely, that the issue was determined in the probate proceed-
ings, it will be assumed on appeal that any objection to de- / 
fects or insufficiency in pleading the defense was waived im-
pliedly or by stipulation. (See Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 
9 Cal.2d 95 [69 P.2d 845, 111 A.L.R. 342] ; Gin S. Ohow v. 
Oity of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673 [22 P.2d 5] ; Bonnelfillio 
v. Ricks, 214 Cal. 287 [4 P.2d 929] ; Newland v. Hatch, 59 
Cal.App.2d 13 [137 P.2d 884].) 
[6] Defendant asserts that the trial court's finding that: 
"This court does not find that this finding is res judicata" 
(that sentence appears in the foregoing quoted excerpt from 
the findings) eliminates the probate decree as being res judi-
cata because the trial court must find on that issue. As we 
have seen all of the factors necessary to make the decree of 
distribution available as a bar were found. The ultimate con-
clusion of whether it was res jUdicata was one of law rather 
than fact. The statement is peculiarly worded and might 
imply that the court does not find on the law issue one way 
or the other. But assuming it is a negative finding it is 
nothing more than a legal conclusion from the facts found, 
a matter upon which this court is at liberty to draw the cor-
rect conclusion to support the judgment. There is nothing 
in Reidy v. Superior Ootwt, 220 Cal. 111 [29 P.2d 780], con-
trary to those views. There this court merely refused to pro-
hibit proceedings in an action in which the defense of res 
judicata was raised because such a plea did not oust the trial 
court of jurisdiction. Nor are the cases of Baird v. Superior 
Oourt, 2'04 Cal. 408 [268 P. 640], Rideaux v. Torgrimson, 12 
Ca1.2d 633 [86 P.2d 826], and United Security Bank & Trust 
00. v. Superior Oourt, 205 Cal. 167 [270 P. 184], contrary. 
Those cases merely adhere to the proposition that a claim of 
res judicata does not oust a court of jurisdiction and that once 
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the trial court 11M made its final adjudication that a former 
judg'lI1cnt is not a har in the instant action, that determination 
is final and conclusive whether right or wrong. They do not 
involve the question of whether a judgment may be affirmed 
ou appeal on the ground that a former judgment is res judi-
cata when in the light of the facts found the question of the 
legal effect of the former judgment is merely a legal conclu-
sion and the trial court's contrary eon elusion on that issue. 
The foregoing conclusions are not altered by the plaintiff's 
assertion that she claims that defendant holds the property 
for her as an involuntary trustee. [7] A constructive trust 
where one unlawfully comes into possession of property of 
a decedent is one imposed by law. The essential question is 
whether it came to them unlawfully. That issue as we have 
seen was determined adversely to plaintiff in the probate pro-
ceeding and is res judicata. [8] Plaintiff alleged that de-
fendant's claim under the will is in violation of the property 
settlem.ent agreement and "cop..stitutes a fraud upon plain-
tiff." At most the fraud would be constructive (see Wein-
stein v. Moers, supra) ; no specific acts of fraud are alleged 
and the court found those allegations untrue. There are no 
pleadings or findings even approaching a showing of extrinsic 
fraud in obtaining the decree of distribution. 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment but for reasons 
other than in the majority opinion. 
The majority opinion rejects plaintiff's contention that 
decedent revoked the legacy to his widow by executing the 
property settlement agreement, on the ground that the decree 
of distribution operates as a bar to this cause of action, that 
"ancillary to and incident of the probate court's jurisdiction 
it had power to determine, as it did, the effect of the agree-
ment on the will and to whom the property of the estate was 
to be distributed." In concluding that the probate court de-
cided the issue concerning the revocation of the legacy as an 
incident of the distribution of the estate, the majority opinion 
relies upon the finding in the distribution decree that the 
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spouses had effected a reconciliation and that their agreement 
was not in effect at the time of decedent's death. It is my 
opinion that this finding has no bearing on the issue of revo-
cation. If decedent revoked the legacy by executing the 
agreement, the subsequent suspension of the agreement by 
reconciliation would not revive the legacy. (In re Lones, 108 
Cal. 688 [41 P. 771] ; see, Ferrier, Revival of a Revoked Will, 
28 Cal.L.Rev. 265, 266.) The finding in question simply indi-
cates that the agreement did not prevent defendant from 
asserting rights to her husband's estate as a legatee under his 
will. The question whether the agreement had become in-
operative before decedent's death was within the jurisdiction 
of the probate court, for that court may refuse to distribute 
any part of the estate to a l~gatee claiming under a valid will, 
if the legatee by a previous agreement or otherwise is estopped 
to assert his rights under the will. (Estate of Crane, 6 Ca1.2d 
218 [57 P.2d 476, 104 A.L.R. 1101].) The probate court, 
however, has no jurisdiction, in a proceeding directed to the 
distribution of the estate, to determine whether the will was 
revoked. Since this question concerns the validity of the will 
submitted to probate, it can be litigated and decided only in a 
will contest. (Estate of Parsons, 196 Cal. 294 [237 P. 7441.) 
If no contest is initiated within the period allowed in sections 
380 and 384 of the Probate Code, the order admitting the will 
to probate is conclusive under section 384 as to the validity of 
the will. (Estate of Parsons, supra; Estate of Baker, 170 Cal. 
578, 585 [150 P. 989] ; Estate of Duraind, 51 Cal.App.2d 206, 
213 [124 P.2d 330].) Plaintiff did not institute a will contest 
within the six-month period allowed by section 380, and is 
therefore bound as to the issue of revocation by the finality 
of the order admitting the will to probate. 
The question remains whether plaintiff in seeking to impress 
a trust on the property received by defendant from the estate 
can rely on the theory that she seeks specific performance of 
the property settlement agreement as a third party bene-
ficiary. It iB settled that a contract of a person to dispose of 
his property by will in a particular manner can be given 
effect as against the will, not by the probate court but by a 
court of equity, and that the remedy to impress a trust on 
the property received by the legatee is in the nature of specific 
performance of the contract. (Estate of Rolls, 193 Cal. 594 
/ 
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[226 P. 608]; Wolf v. Donahue, 206 Cal. 213, 220 [273 P. 
5471; Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal.2d 469, 473 [45 P.2d 198].) 
This remedy applies also to a contract between testator and 
legatee in which the legatee renounces the right to take under 
the will. (Weinstein v. Moers, 207 Cal. 534 [279 P. 444].) 
Since the remedy is in the nature of specific performance, it 
does not depend, as suggested in the majority opinion, upon 
extrinsic fraud. For another reason, however, plaintiff can-
not have a trust impressed upon the property. She cannot 
have such relief without showing that the executory provisions 
of the agreement were in effect at the time of decedent's death. 
She is precluded from so doing by the probate court's finding 
that as a result of a reconciliation of the spouses, the agree-
ment was not in effect at the time of decedent's death. This 
finding, though made upon another cause of action, is con-
clusive upon plaintiff as to this previously litigated issue, 
since a decision rendered between the same parties on the 
same issue estops either party from relitigating the issue even 
in another court or on a different cause of action. (English 
v. English, 9 Ca1.2d 358 [70 P.2d 625, 128 A.L.R. 467] ; Sut-
phin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2'd 195,201 [99 P.2d 652, 101 P.2d 497] ; 
Johnson v. Fontana County F.P. Dist., 15 Ca1.2d 380,389 [101 
P.2d 1092] ; see Restatement, Judgments, § 68.) 
[L. A. No. 18087. In Bank. July 13, 1944.J 
HANCOCK OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (a Cor-
poration) et al., Appellants, v. W. L. HOPKINS et al., 
Respondents. 
[1] Interpleader-Common Law Requirements.-The common law 
bill of interpleader had four essential elements: (1) The same 
thing, debt or duty must be claimed by both or all the parties 
against whom the relief is demanded; (2) all of the adverse 
titles or claims must be dependent, or be derived from a com-
[1] See 30 Am.Jur. 218. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 9, 11-15] Interpleader, § 3; [5, 16, 
17] Interpleader, § 8(2); [6,7] Interpleader, § 4; [8] Landlord and 
Tenant, § 74; [10J Interpleader, § 1; [18J Pleading, § 103. 
